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the Immigration and Nationality Act of 19521 over.the President's veto.
There are substantial differences between the denaturalization provisions of this new act and those of prior acts. Before this act, the denaturalization statute provided for the bringing of suits by the attorney
general to revoke the judgment of naturalization and to cancel the
certificate of naturalization on the ground of fraud or on the ground
that naturalization had been illegally procured.2 The basic provision
for denaturalization is now section 340, which provides for denaturalization on the ground that "such order and certificate of naturalization
were procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation...." 3 Moreover, the new act adds presumptions that certain
acts shall constitute concealment of a material fact or willful misrepresentation. 4

I. Denaturalization Under Prior Acts
Prior to 1906, there was no statutory provision for denaturalization.
The naturalization procedure itself was extremely loose, with the result
that there were many frauds, especially in connection with voting in
elections. Attempts were made by private persons and public officials
to cancel naturalization certificates obtained fraudulently or without
compliance with the law. However, the absence of special law on the
subject produced different results when suits were brought. It was not
clear who had the right to bring the suit, nor was it certain whether
it should be brought in the court where naturalization had been obtained, or in the court in whose jurisdiction the defendant resided. 5
The recognized ground for cancellation was extrinsic fraud, which was
the ground in equity for cancellation of a judgment, but one court
suggested that it was not possible even to use this. 6 Some courts which
had the power to naturalize did not have the power to cancel their
certificates of naturalization because they had no equity jurisdiction.
Inasmuch as the government did not have the statutory authority to
appear and contest the proceeding, and inasmuch as it was not clear
for some time whether the government could appeal from the decree
166 Stat. L. 166 (1952), 8 U.S.C.A. §1101 et seq.
2 34 Stat. L. 601 (1906), 8 U.S.C. (1946) §738.
a 66 Stat. L. 260 (1952), 8 U.S.C.A. §1451.
4 Id., §340(a) and (c), discussed infra in text.
5 The history of denaturalization prior to 1906 is dealt with at length in United States
v. Kusche, (D.C. Cal. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 201 at 220-222.
6 See United States v. Gleason, (C.C. N.Y. 1897) 78 F. 396. Contra: United States
v. Norsch, (C.C. Mo. 1890) 42 F. 417.
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of naturalization,7 specific provision was needed here as well as with
respect to the procedure in naturalization cases. The 1906 act provided
the first statutory authority for cancellation of naturalization. It also
gave the government the right to appear and contest the naturalization.
It was early settled by the Supreme Court that not only was it
constitutional to sue to revoke the judgment of naturalization for fraud
or illegality when the government had not appeared,8 but it was also
permissible for the government both to contest the naturalization proceeding, and then, upon losing, bring suit to revoke the judgment.9
The basis of the decision permitting the government to bring suit when
it had not appeared was that the naturalization proceeding was not
adversary, hence not res judicata, and that denaturalization took from
the alien only his ill-gotten gains.10 The theoretical basis for permitting
suit by the government after it had contested the naturalization proceeding was the concept of jurisdictional fact, viz., that a fulfillment
of the requisites of naturalization was a prerequisite to the naturalization court's obtaining jurisdiction.11 At the same time, the Supreme
Court held that denaturalization is not a criminal proceeding and imposes no punishment, and is therefore not subject to the criminal
procedural guarantees of the Constitution.12 This does not, however,
settle the problem since it is also clear that naturalization is a judgment,13 and that there must therefore be some limit to the government's
power to upset the decree. Recently, the Supreme Court has held, in
a case involving the full faith and credit clause, that where the jurisdictional fact is controverted by the parties, the losing party cannot
institute a suit to cancel the prior judgment on the ground that the
7 The

8

Nationality Act of 1906 gave the government this right. See 34 Stat L. 599,

u.s.c. (1946) §734.

8 Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 32 S.Ct. 613 (1912). In this case,
Johannessen was naturalized prior to 1906 after having been a resident for less than five
years and upon the perjured testimony of witnesses that he had been a resident for five
years. The Supreme Court held that since the government had not been a party, and had
not had prior notice of the naturalization, the naturalization decree was not res judicata.
The statutory provision for denaturalization on the basis of fraud and illegality was sustained in its application to a naturalization proceeding in which the government had not
been a party over the objection that this was an interference with the judiciary and a
violation of the ex post facto clause in the Constitution.
9 United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472, 37 S.Ct. 422 (1917); United States v.
Ness, 245 U.S. 319, 38 S.Ct. 118 (1917).
10 Supra note 8.
11 See Maney v. United States, 278 U.S. 17, 49 S.Ct. 15 (1928). The extent to
which this theory is applicable is not clear even today.
12 Supra note 8.
1s Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 46 S.Ct. 425 (1926).
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court did not have jurisdiction, even though the court may have erroneously decided that it had jurisdiction.14 It has been suggested but
not decided that this case limits the government's right to cancel where
it has, in the naturalization proceeding, contested the jurisdictional
fact. 15
The statutory provision for denaturalization raised a number of
problems. The courts could not agree whether the fraud described in
the statute meant extrinsic fraud or whether intrinsic fraud was sufficient to permit cancellation.16 A court would cancel citizenship for
fraud where no scienter or intent to deceive had been shown,1 7 although
scie:n.ter and intent had generally been held to be a requirement of fraud
as a basis for cancelling a judgrnent.18 The term "illegally procured"
also resulted in conflicts among the courts, some taking the view that
it required an affirmative act by the petitioner,1 9 others holding that an
erroneous finding of fact by the naturalization court or noncompliance,
however slight, with the terms of the naturalization laws, was illegal
procurement.20
Because of the confusion as to what constituted fraud and illegal
procurement the same set of facts might result in denaturalization on
both grounds, or on either ground alone or even in a refusal to denaturalize at all. 21 This meant that the citizenship of others, namely,
those who had been naturalized through the naturalization of a parent
or spouse, might depend on the basis of that decree, since derivative
citizenship was lost if denaturalization occurred on the basis of what
Congress had termed "actual fraud." 22
Although Congress had stipulated that good cause be shown for
bringing a denaturalization suit, this requirement was ignored. 23
Noncompliance with the prerequisites to naturalization, such as
failure to hold the final hearing in open court as required by law,24
14 Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 68 S.Ct. 1087 (1948).
15 Roche, "Statutory Denaturalization: 1906-1950," 13 Umv.

PnT. L. REV. 276 at 287
(1952).
1 6 Cf. United States v. Kusche, (D.C. Cal. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 201, and United States
v. Sweet, (D.C. Mich. 1952) 106 F. Supp. 634.
11 United States v. Stuppiello, (D.C. N.Y. 1919) 260 F. 483.
18 See 49 C.J.S., Judgments, 737-738.
19 United States v. Richmond, (3d Cir. 1927) 17 F. (2d) 28.
20 United States v. Nopoulos, (D.C. Iowa 1915) 225 F. 656.
21 See United States v. Kusche, (D.C. Cal. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 201 at 210-216.
22 54 Stat. L. 1158 (1906), 8 U.S.C. (1946) §738(d).
23 But see United States v. Richmond, (3d Cir. 1927) 17 F. (2d) 28. This is the
only case which the writer found in which the requirement of good cause was mentioned
by the court.
24 United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472, 37 S.Ct. 422 (1917). Cf. United States
v. Richmond, (3d Cir. 1927) 17 F. (2d) 28.
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racial ineligibility for naturalization,2 5 and failure to have :five years of
lawful residence prior to naturalization,26 were generally sufficient to
permit denaturalization. The requirement that petitioners for
naturalization have good moral character created difficulty because it
was undefined, and if the naturalized alien did not have what another
court thought was good moral character, then the naturalization was
subject to cancellation. 27 Literally the statute required good moral
character for the five years previous to naturalization. 28 This did not,
however, make clear whether the naturalization court could consider
behavior prior to the five year period, and the courts were therefore in
disagreement. 29 Nor was it clear whether "good moral character"
meant the character of the ordinary citizen or that of an exemplary
person. 30 The courts disagreed on whether homicide conviction,31
liquor violations,32 failure to support minor children,33 and adultery3 4
precluded the existence of good moral character. Generally, however,
perjury,3 5 running a disorderly hotel,36 and failing to disclose prior
offenses and arrests37 did preclude naturalization.
The statute further required that the petitioner for naturalization
be attached to the Constitution and Laws of the United States, and
that he also renounce allegiance to his former sovereign and take an oath
of allegiance to the United States. 38 This section created additional
difficulties because, like the term "good moral character/' it was undefined. The Supreme Court, after holding for almost twenty years
that a person could not be considered attached to the Constitution and
2lS United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 43 S.Ct. 338 (1923). Cf. United States
v. Pandit, (9th Cir. 1926) 15 F. (2d) 285, cert. den. 273 U.S. 759, 47 S.Ct. 473 (1927),
in which denaturalization was refused on the ground of res judicata.
2 6 United States v. Goldstein, (D.C. N.Y. 1939) 30 F. Supp. 771; United States v.
Parisi, (D.C. Md. 1938) 24 F. Supp. 414.
21 See Turlej v. United States, (8th Cir. 1929) 31 F. (2d) 696.
2 s Cf. In re Ross, (C.C. Pa. 1911) 188 F. 685, and Daddona v. United States, (2d
Cir. 1948) 170 F. (2d) 964.
29 Supra note 28.
80Cf. In re Hopp, (D.C. Wis. 1910) 179 F. 561, and Turlej v. United States, (8th
Cir. 1929) 31 F. (2d) 696.
81 Supra note 29.
82 Supra note 30.
83 Cf. Petition of De Leo, (D.C. Pa. 1948) 75 F. Supp. 896, and In re Nosen, (D.C.
Wash. 1931) 49 F. (2d) 817.
34 Cf. In re Spiegel, (D.C. N.Y. 1928) 24 F. (2d) 605, and United States v. Bischof,
(2d Cir. 1931) 48 F. (2d) 538.
85 In re Spenser, Fed. Case No. 13,234 (1878).
36 In re Kornstein, (D.C. Mo. 1920) 268 F. 172; United States v. Ravaret, (D.C.
Mont. 1915) 222 F. 1018.
87 United States v. Murray, (D.C. Ark. 1943) 48 F. Supp. 920; United States v.
Mancini, (D.C. Pa. 1939) 29 F. Supp. 44.
aa 34 Stat. L. 598 (1906), 8 U.S.C. (1946) §707.
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Laws of the United States unless he could swear to bear arms for the
United States,39 overruled itself and held that bearing arms was not a
prerequisite to naturalization. 40 The lower courts were, in the meantime, plagued with the question of whether an alien's claim of exemption from military service on the ground of alienage prior to the filing
of the petition meant that he was not attached. 41
In the area of political belief, the lower courts, until the famous
Schneiderman, Baumgartner and Knauer cases,4 2 were not sure of
the quantum of proof necessary in a denaturalization proceeding
brought for lack of attachment, nor whether activity after naturalization
could be considered to determine lack of attachment, nor whether
membership or affiliation in certain organizations would be sufficient
to show lack of attachment. They disagreed on whether a desire to
amend the Constitution meant lack of attachment. 43 With the outbreak of World War II, the government brought mass denaturalization
suits against the leading German-American bundists.44 Most of them
were successful, the courts holding, generally, that membership in the
German-American Bund, whether beginning before or after naturaliza-·
tion, indicated lack of attachment to the Constitution and Laws of the
United States at the time of naturalization.45
The first blow to the government's program came with the decision
in Schneiderman v. United States. 46 There the government had
brought denaturalization proceedings for illegal procurement.
Schneiderman, a leader in the Communist Party, was alleged not to
have been attached to the Constitution and Laws of the United States
because, when he was naturalized, he was a member of the Communist
Party, whose tenets, by reason of his active participation therein,
could be imputed to him. Since the Communist Party sought to overthrow the government by force and violence, there could be no attachao United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 49 S.Ct. 448 (1929).
40 Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 66 S.Ct. 826 (1946).
41 Cf. United States v. Siem, (9th Cir. 1924) 299 F. 582, and In re Shanin, (D.C.
Mass. 1922) 278 F. 739.
42 Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 63 S.Ct. 1333 (1943); Baumgartner
v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 64 S.Ct. 1240 (1944); Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S.
654, 66 S.Ct. 1304 (1946).
43 Cf. In re Saralieff, (D.C. Mo. 1932) 59 F. (2d) 436, and United States v. Rovin,
(D.C. Mich. 1926) 12 F. (2d) 942.
44 See, for example, United States v. Kuhn, (D.C. N.Y. 1943) 49 F. Supp. 407;
United States v. Holtz, (D.C. Cal. 1944) 54 F. Supp. 63, affd. in part (D.C. Cal. 1944)
54 F. Supp. 63, revd. in part (9th Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 741, (9th Cir. 1949) 176 F.
(2d) 746.
45 Supra note 44.
46 Supra note 42.
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ment. The Supreme Court held that the government had not sustained the burden of proving that Schneiderman had not been attached.
The burden of proof was declared to be proof which was "clear, unequivocal and convincing." Membership in the Communist Party, in
the absence of proof that the defendant subscribed to its beliefs at the
time he was naturalized, was insufficient. Moreover, it had not been
proved that the Communist Party officially subscribed to belief in the
forceful overthrow of government; it had not been proved that the
defendant held these beliefs; and a belief in state ownership of the
means of production or other radical changes did not preclude attachment. Furthermore, evidence from the period after naturalization was
not entitled to great weight. Although the decision in the Schneiderman case should have clarified the law on this point, the lower courts
in some cases distinguished it on the ground that the case had involved
illegal procurement, not fraud. 47
In Baumgartner v. United States,4 8 this distinction was dispelled
when the Supreme Court, in a suit on the ground of fraud, dismissed
the government's complaint for insufficient proof. Baumgartner was a
member of the German-American Bund and had expressed sympathy
for and advocated the cause of Hitler. The Court held that it could
not be said that he had reserved some allegiance to Hitler in taking the
oath of allegiance, or in renouncing his prior allegiance, since the
a1legiance he had renounced was to the Weimar Republic and Hitler
had not even been in power. The burden of proof was again declared
to be "clear, unequivocal and convincing."
The Schneiderman and Baumgartner decisions made denaturalization more difficult for the government to obtain. Finally, in Knauer
v. United States,49 the Supreme Court upheld the cancellation of
naturalization for lack of attachment to the Constitution and Laws of
the United States and for the taking of a false oath of allegiance.
Knauer, before, during and after his naturalization, was found by the
Court actively to have promoted Hitler's cause in the United States.
He had been a Bund leader of long-standing; he had attempted to make
an organization of German-American clubs into a Nazi front; he had
tried to have the solstice ceremony and the swastika adopted; he had
solicited money and personnel for the German Government. The
government had proved by "clear, unequivocal and convincing" evidence that Knauer had taken a false oath of allegiance and had not been
United States v. Holtz, supra note 44.
Supra note 42.
49 Supra note 42.
47

48
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attached to the Constitution and Laws when he was naturalized. Justice
Rutledge dissented, with Justice Murphy concurring in the dissent.
They felt that Congress did not have the power to denaturalize, that
such a power created two classes of citizens, and that if Congress did
have, and had exercised the power, then the trial should be accorded
all of the procedural guarantees of a criminal trial.
The Schneiderman, Baumgartner and Knauer cases thus stipulated
the quantum of proof required in cases involving the defendant's state
of mind. The government had to prove its claim by "clear, unequivocal and convincing" evidence. And further, these cases declared that
activity after naturalization was not of weight in a denaturalization
proceeding, unless the same type of activity could be shown both
before and during naturalization; they declared that mere membership
in a group could not be used to attribute the views of that group to the
naturalized citizen. The wisdom of the Court's decisions, although
questioned when the nation was at war, cannot be questioned when
looked at in a calmer atmosphere. The Court had prevented the
division of citizens into two classes, naturalized and native-born. The
cases were not, however, based on constitutional grounds, and it is not
therefore clear to what extent they limit the exercise of congressional
power.
The Nationality Act of 1906 created a rebuttable presumption that
a naturalized citizen who returned to his native country or went to
another foreign country within five years after his naturalization had,
at the time of his naturalization, not had the intention to reside permanently in the United States.rm This presumption was retroactive
to citizenship obtained prior to 1906, and it constituted grounds for
revoking the decree of naturalization. In Luria v. United States/' 1
the Supreme Court held that this presumption was constitutional
even as applied to persons naturalized under prior acts, since it created
only a rule of evidence. Even though the defendant had been naturalized under a statute which did not require an intention to reside permanently within the United States, nevertheless the Court felt that it
was an implied requisite, since the naturalized citizen could not otherwise fulfill his obligations of citizenship. The Court also answered
the contention that trial by jury was necessary by declaring that denaturalization proceedings were equitable in nature and not criminal.
The extent to which persons who are naturalized by the naturalization of their parent or spouse lose their citizenship by the denaturaliza110 34 Stat. L. 601 (1906), 8 U.S.C. (1946) §738.
111231 U.S. 9, 34 S.Ct. IO (1913).
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tion of that person depends not only upon statute but also upon the
theory upon which denaturalization rests. It has been assumed,112
without adequate discussion, that, since naturalization is a judicial
decree, the cancellation of it makes it void ab initio. On this theory,
all persons having derivative citizenship would lose their citizenship
upon the denaturalization of the person through whom they were
naturalized, except to the extent that they were protected by congressional stipulation. No case involving derivative citizenship has come
before the Supreme Court. However, Congress, in the Nationality
Act of 1940, stipulated that the denaturalization was to affect other
persons' rights only in cases of "actual fraud." 53 The lower courts
which dealt with this provision leaned over backwards to protect the
derivatively naturalized citizen.11'4 Although the void ab initio theory
is extremely harsh, legal theory would seem to support the view that
no rights can be derived from a judgment which is subsequently
cancelled. 1111

II. Interpretation and Constitutionality of the Present Provisions
A. Denaturalization upon rescission of adjustment of status: section 246 (b). Under sections 244 and 245, the attorney general may
adjust the status of deportable aliens (section 244) and nonimmigrant
aliens (section 245) to that of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent
residence. Section 246 provides that this adjustment of status may be
rescinded at any time within five years after it has been granted if it
shall appear to the satisfaction of the attorney general that the person
was not in fact eligible for such adjustment of status. The person
whose adjustment of status is thus rescinded then returns to his prior
status. Subsection (b) of section 246 provides that a person naturalized under an adjustment of status subsequently rescinded is subject
to denaturalization under section 340 as a person whose naturalization
was procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation. The wording is slightly ambiguous, in that the words
"for which such person was not in fact eligible" can be interpreted to
mean that a court can inquire into the question of whether the person
112 See Roche, "Statutory Denaturalization: 1906-1951," 13 Umv. Prrr. L. RBv. 276
at 295 (1952). Cf. note, 50 CoL. L. RBv. 674 at 678 (1950).
53 54 Stat. L. 1158 (1906), 8 U.S.C. (1946) §738(d).
M See In re Bolter, (D.C. Cal. 1946) 66 F. Supp. 566; Sanders v. Clark, (D.C. Pa.
1948) 76 F. Supp. 489.
55 It can be argued that the derivatively naturalized citizen should not be bound by
the cancellation because not a party to the suit, and that, since denaturalization is a suit
in equity, the court of equity could protect the rights of innocent persons.
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was eligible for adjustment. However, subsection (a) leaves the
decision to the attorney general's discretion. The interpretation which
is closer to the language would be that the question may not be
litigated in a denaturalization proceeding. However, it may then
be argued that it violates due process of law, since the defendant
is unable to be heard on the legality of the attorney general's rescission.
The underlying basis of the denaturalization proceeding under this
section is that the attorney general made an erroneous determination.
The erroneous determination of the party seeking relief is not ordinarily
sufficient equitable cause for relief from a judgment, especially if that
is the sole basis upon which relief is sought. Therefore, the question
will arise, under either interpretation of the statute, whether cancellation of a naturalization decree can be obtained on a basis for which
other judgments cannot be revoked.116
B. Changes in the prerequisites to naturalization. Inasmuch as
failure to meet the prerequisites to naturalization formerly, and probably today, constitutes a basis for denaturalization, changes in the
prerequisites to naturalization are of significance in a study of denaturalization.
Section 311 of the new act withdraws the much controverted
racial requirements for naturalization.
Section 313 continues the political requirements of prior acts. It
prohibits the naturalization of persons opposed to government or law,
or who favor totalitarian forms of government. This includes persons
who are members of or affiliated with the Communist Party, the Communist Political Association, which is undefined, any Communistaction organization required to register under the Subversive Activities
Control Act of 1950, or any Communist-front organization at the time
it is registered or required to register. However, where the alien is a
member or affiliate of a Communist front, he may make himself
eligible for naturalization by proving that he did not know, and had
no reason to believe, during his membership or affiliation, that the
organization was a Communist front. The maintenance of membership or affiliation after registration of the organization apparently pre'cludes naturalization, regardless of lack of knowledge. The prohibition further includes persons who advocate the doctrines of world
56 It could, however, be argued that admission for permanent residence is a jurisdictional fact and that the subsequent rescission relates back. On this theory, the naturalizing
court would not have had jurisdiction. Even on this theory, though, a hearing will probably be necessary. See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 73 S.Ct. 472 (1953),
involving exclusion of resident alien. Cf. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 72 S.Ct. 525
(1952).
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communism or totalitarianism and members and affiliates of organizations which advocate such doctrines, persons who advocate or are members of or affiliated with organizations which advocate the violent overthrow of government, assassination, the unlawful damage of property
or sabotage, and persons who publish, write or circulate writing advocating the violent overthrow of government, etc., or the doctrines of world
communism or totalitarianism, or who are members of or affiliated
with organizations that do so. This section of the act disqualifies persons who would fall within one of the above categories within the ten
years immediately preceding the filing of the petition or the taking of
the final oath of citizenship. However, persons who were members or
affiliates of the above organizations may qualify for citizenship upon
proof that they were members or affiliates by necessity or only before
they were sixteen. Thus the entire section is keyed to the Internal
Security Act of 1950.57
Section 315 makes aliens who apply for and obtain exemption
from the armed forces on ground of alienage ineligible.
Section 316 reenacts the requirements of five years lawful residence,
continuous residence from the time of the petition to the time of admission, and good moral character. It defines what constitutes a break
in residence and stipulates that a court, in determining whether the
petitioner has good moral character, may consider the petitioner's conduct and activities prior to the five year period. Good moral character
is defined by section 101 (f) to exclude persons who have committed
adultery, persons who have been convicted of or have committed certain crimes, and persons whose income is derived from certain sources,
such as illegal gambling activities. However, a court may find that a
petitioner does not have good moral character although his activity
does not fall within one of the exclusions. Section 316 also provides
that a person may not be naturalized while registration proceedings
are pending against an organization of which he is a member or
affiliate.
Section 317 exempts from certain of the residence requirements
persons performing the ministerial or priestly functions of a religious
denomination or an interdenominational mission organization having
a bona fide organization within the United States. This provision is
a broadening of the prior provision, since it includes persons going
abroad for interdenominational organizations. 58 However, the present
57 See

58 Cf.

64 Stat. L. 1013, 8 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §705.
the former provision at 54 Stat. L. 1143 (1940), 8 U.S.C. (1946) §707.
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provision requires that the person shall have been physically present
in the United States for an uninterrupted period of at least one year.
Section 318 prohibits the naturalization of persons against whom
there are pending proceedings for deportation or against whom there
is a final order of deportability.
Section 329 provides for the naturalization of persons in active-duty
service in the armed forces during World War I or World War II.
However, subsection (c) provides for denaturalization if the person is
later separated from the armed forces under other than honorable
conditions. 59 This is clearly conditional citizenship, but it has not
been tested before the courts. It has affected a few persons,60 but if it
is possible to create a conditional citizenship, then this would seem to
be a reasonable exercise of that power. However, since a conditional
decree of citizenship is something not contemplated by a judicial system, and since it is closer to additional punishment for the act for which
the persons are discharged than the ordinary revocation of a decree,
the constitutional objection that it interferes with the judiciary might
be posed against it.
Section 334 does away with the need for filing a declaration of
intention.
Section 337 requires-an oath of the petitioner renouncing his prior
allegiance, swearing to support and defend the Constitution against
all enemies, to bear true faith and allegiance to the same and to bear
arms on behalf of the United States when required by law. However,
persons opposed to the bearing of arms on religious grounds need not
take an oath to bear arms. 61

C. Denaturalization for concealment of a material fact or willful
misrepresentation: section 340. Section 340 is the primary section
for denaturalization. The grounds for denaturalization are now "that
such order and certificate of naturalization were procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation." "Conceal59 An unusual change appears in the present provision. Whereas the prior act authorized denaturalization when the naturalized citizen was dishonorably discharged, the present
provision authorizes denaturalization when the naturalized soldier was discharged under
other than honorable conditions. Apparently this effects a change in the administrative
application of the provision.
60 S. Rep. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d sess., p. 922 (1950).
61 Jnterested persons should note the details of the oath. Apparently persons who
cannot take an oath to bear arms, when that refusal is not based on religious grounds, are
precluded from naturalization.
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ment of a material fact" and "willful misrepresentation" are substituted
for the former "fraud" and "illegally procured," which were the bases
for denaturalization from 1906 until the effective date of the present
act.
The reasons for the change, as stated in Senate Report 1515,62
which was referred to in the pending Senate Bill, are as follows:
(1) Judicial conflict as to whether the fraud had to be extrinsic
or whether intrinsic fraud would suffice;63
(2) Conflict as to whether disloyal statements made after
naturalization could be used as proof to show that naturalization had
been obtained fraudulently because of concealment or lack of attachment;64
(3) Conflict as to the res judicata status of naturalization proceedings where the government had appeared as· an adverse party;65
( 4) The lack of definition of "attachment to the Constitution,"
thereby raising the question whether the alien had merely to bring forth
two witnesses who would testify as to his attachment or whether he
had to be really attached, and raising the additional question of the
evidentiary effect of the alien's membership in an organization which
advocated the overthrow of the Government of the United States;66
(5) The quantum of proof required of the government by the
Schneiderman, Baumgartner and Knauer cases.67
Both the proponents and the opponents of the new legislation felt
that the new wording of the denaturalization provisions would clear
up these questions and make denaturalization easier to obtain. 68
The first problem created by the new section is that it has no
judicial background to aid in interpretation, and that, although it was
interpreted by Congress as being more stringent than the prior terms
"fraud" and "illegally procured," it apparently strikes the ground of
illegality from denaturalization. Thus, denaturalization probably can
no longer be used where the ground is failure to file a certificate of
S. Rep. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d sess. (1950).
at 756. .
64Jbid.
65Jbid.
t16 Id. at 762.
t11 Id. at 769.
· 68 Ibid. See also the speech of Representative Powell of New York at 98
4506 (1952).
62

68 Id.
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arrival, 69 failure of the judge to have the hearing in open court, 70 or
any other merely procedural defect for which the defendant was not
to blame. Moreover, it would seem that where the defendant, in the
naturalization proceeding, had neither concealed nor misrepresented
any fact and the government had contested the proceeding but lost,
then it could not bring a denaturalization proceeding under section 340,
since there would be neither "concealment of a material fact" nor "willful misrepresentation." 71 It would seem that where the misrepresentation is not willful but based on the defendant's failure to understand
so~ething, the government would be unable to cancel the certificate. 72
Thus the plain effect of the new provision makes it appear that certain
bases for denaturalization are no longer available to the government.
However, it is clear that the change was intended to increase the
bases for denaturalization. To the extent that it makes every statement of the defendant, whether great or small in significance, material
to the naturalization proceeding, it will increase the bases for denaturalization. In part, however, this will depend on the interpretation given
to "concealment of a material fact." Some courts, just as they interpreted "illegally procured" to require an affirmative act on the part
of the defendant,73 may require that the concealment also be intentional. The new provision is therefore likely to cause much of the
same judicial conflict that the old provision did. However, it could
be strongly urged that Congress did not intend to require scienter
where concealment is concerned, since it required willfulness where
a misrepresentation was concerned but did not mention it in the case
of concealment. It is clear that the provision extinguishes the conflict in the courts on whether denaturalization requires extrinsic rather
than intrinsic fraud. Moreover, if the courts consider the legislative
intent, then they will no longer exact the quantum of proof required
by the Schneiderman, Baumgartner and Knauer cases when denaturalization is brought on a ground involving the naturalized citizen's
state of mind at the time of being naturalized. The present section,
on the other hand, could be interpreted in the same way as the prior
69 For example under prior act, see United States v. Ness, 245 U.S. 319, 38 S.Ct. 118
(1917).
70 For example under prior act, see United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472, 37 S.Ct.
422 (1917), in which the defendant was denaturalized because the naturalizing judge held
the proceeding in his chambers.
71 For result under prior act, see United States v. Ravaret, (D.C. Mont. 1915) 222 F.
1018.
72 For result under prior act, see supra note 17.
73 United States v. Srednik, (3d Cir. 1927) 19 F. (2d) 71; supra note 19.
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provisions, and this might be necessary in order to avoid constitutional
questions. It could moreover be argued with some force that the congressional intent was expressed in subsection (c) of section 340,74
which is discussed later in this comment, and that the failure to express
this intent in subsection (a) means that Congress did not intend to
change the quantum of proof required by the Schneiderman, Baumgartner and Knauer decisions except as to subsection (c). To illustrate
what the legislators meant, let us pose a hypothetical situation. Suppose the defendant, at the time he was naturalized, was a member of
the German-American Bund. Clearly, under the Supreme Court's
interpretation of fraud and illegal procurement, he could not be denaturalized for that fact alone. 75 Nevertheless, under the present act,
he could be considered as having concealed a material fact. The
constitutional question arises at this point. It is clear that, although
naturalization is a judicial proceeding, the courts will go along with
Congress quite far in exacting the literal requirements of the naturalization statutes.76 Yet, if there was no provision prohibiting the defendant's naturalization because of his membership and if he did not willfully conceal his association, there is no way to fit the defendant's concealment within one of the ordinary bases for the revocation of a
judicial decree. The court could say that this is not a material fact
in spite of the intent of Congress to authorize denaturalization in this
type of case. 77 It could hold that concealment requires an intent to
conceal. 78 Or it could hold that concealment does not require an
affirmative act of concealment and thereby bring the defendant within the denaturalization provisions.79 If it holds the latter, then the
constitutional question of interference by Congress with the decrees
of courts will necessarily arise. The court could then hold, on the
constitutional question, either that the ordinary bases for the revocation
74 In subsection (c) of section 340, Congress expressed its intent that activity after
naturalization be considered extremely relevant to the petitioner's state of mind; therefore,
the burden of going forward with evidence of his state of mind at the time of naturalization
was placed on the naturalized alien.
75 See Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 64 S.Ct. 1240 (1944), and
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. ll8, 63 S.Ct. 1333 (1943).
76 For example, see United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472, 37 S.Ct. 422 (1917).
77 Although it is difficult to believe that a court could hold that membership in the
German-American Bund or in the Communist Party is not material, nevertheless, it would
be possible where the naturalized alien was a member or affiliate of a front organization, for
example, the American Youth for Democracy, especially if the membership or affiliation
was at an early age.
78 For analogous cases, see supra note 73.
79 For analogous cases, see supra note 72.
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of judgments are inapplicable to naturalization decrees and that Congress is acting reasonably in providing for this basis of revocation,so
or that naturalization decrees are ordinary judicial judgments, subject
to the same rules, and therefore that this is unconstitutional as an interference with the power of the judiciary.81 It seems out of the question
to propose that a court might decide that naturalization is not a judicial
decree, because the courts have been naturalizing since the first
naturalization statutes, and since there is a long line of precedent that
naturalization is a judicial proceeding and a case and controversy. The
objection that the provision might be deemed ex post facto would not,
it appears, in the light of the Supreme Court's decision in the Johannessen case82 avail the defendant. In the light of the Supreme Court's
decisions and inasmuch as the language of this new provision is subject
to different interpretations, it would seem that the provision will probably be held constitutional but will be watered down to avoid hardship and possible constitutional questions.
Subsection (a) of section 340 further provides that"... such revocation and setting aside of the order admitting such person to citizenship and such cancelling of certificate of naturalization shall be effective as of the original date of the order and certificate. . . ." The
Supreme Court has never discussed the question of the void ab initio
doctrine as it applies to denaturalization. Lower courts have, however, discussed it in connection with derivative citizenship, and,
although they have not rejected it, they have sought to mitigate its
consequences. 83 It is an extremely harsh doctrine, especially since
it has been held that those deriving their citizenship through the
naturalization of another cannot intervene to contest the denaturalization of that other.84 However, the doctrine seems to be in accord with
traditional legal theory.
Subsection (a) of section 340 adds a further proviso that "refusal
on the part of a naturalized citizen within a period of ten years following his naturalization to testify as a witness in any proceeding before
a congressional committee concerning his subversive activities, in a
case where such person has been convicted of contempt for such refusal,
so For precedent for this view, see supra note 8.
Bl See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 31 S.Ct. 250 (1911), in which the
Supreme Court struck down a statute interfering with its powers unconstitutionally.
82 Supra note 8.
83 Supra note 54.
84 United States ex rel. Harrington v. Schlotfeldt, (7th Cir. 1943) 136 F. (2d) 935,
cert. den. sub nom. Krause v. United States, 327 U.S. 781, 66 S.Ct. 680 (1946).
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shall be held to constitute a ground for revocation of such person's
naturalization under this subsection as having been procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation." Strenuous
constitutional objections can be made to this. In the first place, the
term subversive is undefined by the act. Webster's dictionary defines
it as "tending to subvert; having a tendency to overthrow, upset or
destroy."85 In the Schneiderman case,86 the Supreme Court held
that charges not advanced in the complaint of the government could
not be considered because denaturalization was an important adjudication of status. The reason behind the opinion must have been that there
must be some notice to the defendant in denaturalization, and it seems
very clear that the word "subversive" is so vague as not to give any.
Therefore the provision is subject to attack under the "void for vagueness" doctrine, although that doctrine is most commonly applied in
criminal proceedings. 87 The second objection to this provision is
that it is an unreasonable presumption and therefore contrary to due
process. It does not seem reasonable to presume from the conviction
of contempt of Congress for failure to answer questions concerning
one's subversive activities that one has obtained naturalization by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation. Moreover, the presumption is conclusive which would, in any case, make
it even more dubious and subject to the argument that it was put in
the naturalization laws solely as a weapon against persons who refused
to testify before congressional committees. In Tot v. United States, 88
the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a provision of the Federal
Firearms Act making it unlawful for any person who had been convicted of a crime of violence or was a fugitive from justice to receive
any firearms or ammunition which had been shipped or transported in
interstate commerce, and creating a presumption from the prisoner's
prior conviction of a crime of violence and his present possession of a
firearm or ammunition, that the article was received in interstate
commerce and that such receipt occurred after the effective date of the
act. The Court stated the prerequisite for the creation of a statutory
85WEllSTER's Nnw INrmtNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF TBil ENGLISH l.ANGUAGB 2516
(1951).
86 Supra note 42.
87 See N.B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Relining Co., 267 U.S. 233, 45 S.Ct. 295
(1925) (civil case); Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126
(1925) (criminal case); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S.Ct. 618 (1939)
(criminal case). For application of the "void for vagueness" doctrine to deportation proceedings, see Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 71 S.Ct. 703 (1951).
88 319 U.S. 463, 63 S.Ct. 1241 (1943). See also Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. l, 49
S.Ct. 215 (1929), and Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 31 S.Ct. 145 (1911).
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presumption: there had to be some rational connection between the fact
proved and the ultimate fact presumed; the fact that the defendant had
the better knowledge would not justify the presumption. In that
statute, the presumption was rebuttable; here the presumption is conclusive. Therefore it is arguable that this provision violates due process of law. The ex post facto clause would probably not apply, unless ·
the Johannessen case89 can be construed to mean that the Supreme
Court was merely recognizing the right previously existing in the government to bring suit to revoke a judgment of naturalization obtained by
fraud. This provision also interferes with the judiciary since it tests
an otherwise valid judgment by events occurring subsequent to its
being rendered. Moreover, even if it is argued that conditional
citizenship is possible, which is unthinkable to at least some members
of the Supreme Court,90 nevertheless, this is not conditional citizenship
since it is made expressly retroactive to prior naturalizations by subsection (i) of section 340. Obviously there is the objection that this
is the creation of two classes of citizenship, which was certainly not
contemplated by our Founding Fathers when they gave Congress the
power to make uniform laws for naturalization.91 The provision may
also violate due process because of its inequality of operation on nativeborn and naturalized citizens. It is actually a criminal provision, with
banishment as its end objective.
Subsection (b) of section 340 provides that where the "naturalized
person is absent from the United States or from the judicial district
in which such person last had his residence, such notice shall be given
either by personal service upon him or by publication in the manner .
provided for the service of summons by publication or upon absentees
by the law of the State or place where such suit is brought." To the
extent that this provision gives the government an alternative, rather
than providing that the best notice possible be given to the defendant,
89 Supra note 8. If the Johannessen case is construed to recognize the previously
existing right of the government to sue to revoke a judgment obtained by fraud, then there
is no ex post facto clause involved in the case, and the Court's opinion that the ex post
facto clause does not apply to denaturalization proceedings becomes dictum. For cases
involving the ex post facto clause, see Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 277
(1867), and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 333 (1867).
90 See dissent of Justice Rutledge in Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654 at 675,
66 S.Ct. 1304 (1946).
91 The doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions" may limit the power of a legislature
to impose conditions upon the grant of privileges. See, for example, Western Union Telegraph Company v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 30 S.Ct. 190 (1910); Frost v. Railroad Commission of California, 271 U.S. 583, 46 S.Ct. 605 (1926).
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this provision may fall within the proscription of Mullane 11. Central
Hano11er Bank & Trust Co.92 as a denial of due process.
Subsection (c) of section 340 provides: "If a person who shall
have been naturalized after the effective date of this chapter shall
within £ve years next following such naturalization become a
member of or affiliated with any organization, membership in or
affiliation with which at the time of naturalization would have precluded such person from naturalization under the provisions of section
313, it shall be considered prima facie evidence that such person was
not attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States
at the time of naturalization, and, in the absence of countervailing
evidence, it shall be sufficient in the proper proceeding to authorize
the revocation and setting aside of the order admitting such person to
citizenship and the cancellation of the certificate of naturalization as
having been obtained by concealment of a material fact or by willful
misrepresentation...." A reasonable interpretation of this subdivision
is that it will cover only a person joining an organization which, at the
time he was naturalized, would have fallen within one of the section
313 categories; joining an organization which was not, at the time
defendant was naturalized, within one of the subsections of section
313, but which came within its scope after he was naturalized, would
not affect the status of the naturalized person. Moreover, this subdivision is not retroactive to naturalizations obtained prior to this act.
This subsection reverses the Schneiderman, Baumgartner and Knauer
cases on the quantum of proof, the inferences which may be drawn
from membership in an association, and the weight to be given to
activity subsequent to naturalization. The constitutional problem thus
raised is that this may violate the due process clause because of the
irrationality of the presumption.93 It does not necessarily follow from
one's affiliation, after naturalization, with an organization which was
totalitarian or communistic at the time of naturalization that as long
ago as perhaps five years one was not attached to the Constitution and
not well disposed to the good order and peace of the United States.
Moreover, when the charge is that of affiliation, which is defined in
section 101 (e) (2) as including the giving of money, or that of
membership or affiliation in a Communist-front organization, the presumption becomes even les~ rational. In the Baumgartner case, Justice
92 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652 (1950). See also Wuchter v. Pizzuti, 276 U.S. 13,
48 S.Ct. 259 (1928).
93 Supra note 88.
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Frankfurter, in writing the opinion of the Court, said, "In short, the
weakness of the proof as to Baumgartner's state of mind at the time he
took the oath of allegiance can be removed, if at all, only by a presumption that disqualifying views expressed after naturalization were accurate
representations of his views when he took the oath. The logical validity
of such a presumption is at best dubious even were the supporting
evidence less rhetorical and more conclusive." 94 It is submitted that
the same thing might be said of this statutory presumption. The
recent case of Weiman 11. Updegraff,95 tends to indicate that the
Supreme Court adheres to its former view, as expressed in the
Schneiderman, Baumgartner and Knauer cases, that beliefs are individual and that the beliefs of a group cannot be attributed to members
merely on the basis of membership.
Subsection (d) of section 340 states a presumption that persons
who return to their native country or go to any other country within
£.ve years after naturalization and take up permanent residence there,
did not, at the time they were naturalized, intend to take up permanent
residence in the United States; denaturalization is therefore authorized.
A similar provision was sustained by the United States Supreme Court
in Luria 11. United States.96
Subsection (e) provides for the maintenance of citizenship of persons derivatively naturalized when the person through whom they
obtained citizenship is denaturalized under the provisions of the
Nationality Act of 1940.
In Senate Report 1515, the subcommittee stated that the term
"actual fraud" had created confusion.97 Congress took this into consideration in subsection (f) of section 340 and provided for the derivative's loss of citizenship except in specified situations. The citizenship
of the derivative is protected provided he is in the United States at the
time of the denaturalization, and provided that the denaturalization is
based upon membership in an organization within five years after
naturalization, the establishment of permanent residence abroad within five years after naturalization, or discharge for other than honorable
cause from the armed forces after naturalization was procured under
section 329. The citizenship of the derivative is lost if the person
through whom he is naturalized is denaturalized under the general
94 322 U.S. 665 at 677, 64 S.Ct. 1240 (1944). See also note, 51 CoL. L. REv. 606 at
645-646 (1951).
95 344 U.S. 183, 73 S.Ct. 215 (1952).
96 Supra note 51.
97 S. Rep. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d sess., p. 765 (1950).
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denaturalization provisions of section 340 (a) or under the other de-naturalization provisions. This is one of the most harsh and arbitrary
provisions of the entire act. It denaturalizes persons for acts done for
which they can on no account be considered responsible. It is enacted
on the corruption of blood concept. It is, however, in accord with the
void ab initio doctrine and will probably be sustained.
Subsection (i) makes the present denaturalization provisions -retroactive to naturalization obtained under prior laws.
In Bindczyck 11. Finucane,98 the Supreme Court held that Congress,
by providing for denaturalization under section 338 of the Nationality
Act of 1940, had expressed the intent that this, and the other denaturalization provisions of the statute, be the exclusive methods for
cancelling the citizenship of naturalized persons. Therefore a state
court could not vacate the decree admitting an alien to citizenship within its term of court and pursuant to state law. Subsection (j) overrules
this decision.
D. Cancellation of certi-ficate of naturalization: section 342. Section 342 of the statute provides for the cancellation of certificates of
naturalization by the attorney general and his subordinates if it appears
to his, or their, satisfaction, that the certificate was obtained by fraud
or illegality, practiced on him, the commissioner or a deputy commissioner. Cancellation of the certificate has no effect on the citizenship
status of the person in whose name the document was issued, and it
affects only the document. However, although this would seem to
affect only a piece of paper, it can make difficult the establishment of
legal rights. Since it provides for no judicial proceeding, and since it
does not even set standards for the attorney general and his subordinates, it would appear to deny due process to the individual affected.
Moreover, this same subsection provides for notice only at the person's last known place of residence, and may result in a denial of due
process under the doctrine of the Mullane case.99
W. Conclusions

The original thesis that led to statutory provision for denaturalization was that there had been a great deal of fraud and illegality in the
procurement of naturalization. These provisions were upheld on the
theory that naturalization is a privilege and should not be used as a
os 342 U.S. 76, 72 S.Ct. 130 (1951).
99 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652 (1950).

902

MicmGAN LAw R.Evmw

[ Vol. 51

means to obtain undeserved benefits. In decisions arising from World
War II cases, the Supreme Court placed limits on the power of the
government to denaturalize. These limits seem definitely desirable
to protect naturalized citizens in periods of national stres_s. In one
sweep, Congress has attempted to end these limits.
Although it is obvious from an examination of the conflicting
decisions of the courts that some revision and clarification was necessary, the extent of the revision is inconsistent with the ideology of a
democratic nation. Denaturalization should be available where fraud
or illegality occurred in the naturalization proceeding because of the ·
affirmative, conscious act of the naturalized citizen. It should not be
available as a limit on the naturalized citizen's beliefs and associations.

Lois H. Hambro, S.Ed.

